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Over the last 15 years, economists of Resources for the Future led by John Krutilla have 
been developing a new approach to wilderness preservation. This paper offers a concise 
exposition of their approach and adds a few new steps. The basic ingredient of the new 
approach is a perception of declining net benefits of wilderness development and rising net 
benefits of wilderness preservation over time. These alter the entire shape of the benefit-cost 
analysis of potential development. The new steps involve reversibility, postponability, and 





Over the last 15 years, economists of Resources for the Future led by John Rrutilla 
have been developing a new approach to wilderness preservation. They reject the 
narrowly viewed profitability of a project as an adequate criterion for the acceptabil- 
ity of the project when it destroys wilderness values, insisting that the current and 
future value to society of the preserved wilderness area be explicitly considered2 
This idea of measuring the opportunity cost of wilderness has not been without 
opponents, even from within the preservationist cam~.~ But they have managed, in a 
decade, to add a strong economic foundation to the emotional and philosophical 
defense of wilderness preservation. 
The purpose of this paper is to offer a concise exposition of their approach and to 
add a few new steps. In Section I, the basic contribution of the new approach is 
explained, in terms of three new parameters that are introduced into the develop- 
ment decision. In Section II, the precise way in which these parameters affect the 
decision is examined. In Section III, the relationship between the new approach and 
the timing of irreversible development decisions is developed. In Section IV, some of 
the problems of estimation of the newly introduced parameters are discussed. In 
Section V, the implications for the analysis are explored for a world where more 
than one interest rate is observed; specifically, the new approach is extended to 
consider two discount rates, a rate of marginal capital productivity and a rate of 
time preference. Criteria are derived, in Section VI, for reversible wilderness develop- 
ments and in Section VII, for postponement of exhaustible wilderness developments. 
A brief summary is offered in Section VIII. 
'I am indebted for helpful comments on an earlier draft to E. M. Gramlich, J. V. Krutilla, P. Portney, 
H. R. Varian, and E. A. Wilman. 
21his approach, of course, examines social rather than commercial profitability. 
3For example, S. A. Cain: “I would not, in defending the wilderness, try to compete with the dollar 
values of the marketplace. . .One believes in wilderness, or he doesn’t.” [9, p. 191. 
59 
0095~06%/82/010000-22$2.00/O 
Copyright 0 1982 by Academic Press, Inc. 
All rights of rqmduction in any form reserved 
60 RICHARD C. PORTER 
This “new approach” is intended to be operational-indeed, it has been devel- 
oped in the course of a series of specific wilderness development battles4-and, as a 
result, two important aspects of recent wilderness discussions are largely ignored. 
One, the general-equilibrium approach treats wilderness as an irreversibly exhaus- 
tible stock and examines the individual development project as an incremental 
decision; the “new approach” concentrates, in traditional benefit-cost fashion, on 
the project itself, although the values of the exogenous parameters reflect an implicit 
view of the general-equilibrium system. And two, decision making under uncertainty 
intrudes critically when an irreversible development decision is considered where the 
foregone future wilderness values are currently unclear; 5 benefit-cost analysis, in this 
area as elsewhere, is not yet equipped to handle uncertainty explicitly and comfort- 
ably. 
I. THE NEW APPROACH 
Traditionally, the evaluation of a proposed project to introduce development into 
a wilderness area has considered an unpriced preservation alternative as a situation 
of neither benefit nor cost. The question asked was simply whether the anticipated 
flow of benefits derived from development exceeded the flow of costs (both in a 
present value sense). For example, consider a development project that initially costs 
$1 and yields an instantaneous flow of real net social benefits of $D (D for 
Development) forever after. The traditional calculation of the present value (PV) of 
the project now (i.e., at t = 0), using a social discount rate of i, is 
PV=-1+ O3 J 
D De-“$jf= -1 +- . 
r=o 1 
This relationship between PV and i is shown in Fig. 1. Clearly, the project passes the 
PV test if the flow of net benefits (D) exceeds the social discount rate (i). 
Under the new approach, two additional elements are considered in this present 
value calculation. First, the development of a wilderness area destroys any benefits 
society might have derived from the continued existence of the area in an undis- 
turbed state. The present value calculation must then include, as a cost of develop- 
ment, the real, net foregone flow of benefits of preservation, $P (P for Preservation). 
The preservation benefits include not only those that accrue to users of the 
wilderness but also any existence, option, and “quasi-option” values. Some of these 
values inevitably involve uncertainty, but the benefit-cost analysis typically assumes 
that all variables are known for certain, or that the use of expected values does not 
introduce important error. The PV becomes; 
pv= -1 +D- 
i / 
OOpe-‘:d~= -1 +D-if. 
t=o i 1 
This relationship between PV and i is exactly the same as that shown in Fig. 1 with 
one change-the hyperbola now crosses the i-axis at (D - P) rather than at D. 
Thus, the development project passes the PV test only if its flow of net benefits (D) 
4Reference [25, and the works cited therein]. 
‘Both of these concerns are prominent in Arrow’s writings-see [2-41. See also the literature on 
“option values” [ 11, and the works cited therein]. 
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FIGURE 1 
exceeds the sum of the discount rate (i) and the flow of net benefits with 
preservation (P). The criterion for acceptance of the development project has been 
made more stringent, D > i + P rather than D > i. 
The second element of the new approach involves the time paths of the flows of 
net benefits from development and from preservation. A fundamental asymmetry is 
perceived in these time paths. Development of wilderness is seen as the extraction or 
production of a physical product which exhaustion or technological advance will 
probably render less valuable as time passes. Wilderness preservation, on the other 
hand, is seen as the provision of services with-by the nature of wilderness-a quite 
inelastic supply curve that is shifting steadily inward as a result of encroachment and 
congestion.6 While these are plausible, and to some convincing, arguments, the real 
issue is whether they are empirically accurate in each specific application. Since I am 
here interested in exploring the conceptual implications of this asymmetry, I will not 
question these general perceptions. 
Consider an exponential process whereby the preservation benefits at time t (P,) 
grow at rate p from an initial rate of P, 
P, = Pep’, (3) 
and the development benefits at time t (0,) decline at rate 6 from an initial rate of 
D, 
D, = De-“‘. (4 
The PV becomes’ 
PV= -1+ (i+8)tdt _ ~;ope-(‘-P)+&, 
P 
=-1++- i-p’ (5) 
6Note the implicit general-equilibrium system. 
‘Assuming, as we must if PV is to be finite, that i > p. 
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FIGURE 2 
This PV, IQ. (5), represents more change than at first meets the eye. Whereas the 
introduction of P shifted to the right the hyperbola that related PV to i (as in Fig. l), 
this second change, the introduction of p and 6, fundamentally alters the shape of 
the relationship of PV and i. As Fig. 2 shows, for a development project to pass the 
PV test, the rate of discount (i) must lie in a particular range, i.e., between i, and i,.* 
The reason for this double boundary on i is easily seen. For sufficiently high rates of 
discount (i.e., for i > i, in Fig. 2), the development project fails for the traditional 
reason, that the benefits it yields (D or 0,) are too heavily discounted to offset the 
initial cost of the project. And for sufficiently low rates of discount (i.e., for i < i, in 
Fig. 2), the exponentially growing benefits- of preservation (P,) are so little dis- 
counted that their perpetual loss becomes too great a cost for the development 
project to shoulder. Thus, for sufficiently low or sufficiently high discount rates, the 
development project will fail its PV test. 
In short, the preservationists’ new approach narrows the range of social discount 
rates for which a development project will appear profitable. The precise way in 
which the new parameters (P, p, and 6) affect the PV test is illuminating and is 
examined in the next section. 
II. THE NEW PARAMETERS 
The new approach to any controversy between preservation and development of 
wilderness areas insists that three new concepts be introduced into the analysis, and 
these concepts are captured, in the illustrative stereotypical development project of 
Section I (with PV Eq. (5)), by the three new parameters: P, the current flow of real 
net benefits attributable to the area in its current natural state; p, the anticipated 
‘Figure 2 is drawn for a project for which fi > @+ m (this inequality is developed and 
discussed in Section II). 
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FIGURE 3 
exponential rate of growth of these preservation benefits; and S, the anticipated 
exponential rate of decay of the real net benefits of the projected development.9 The 
impact of their addition, as shown in Section I, is to alter fundamentally the shape of 
the PV criterion (from that of Fig. 1 toward that of Fig. 2). In fact, however, Fig. 2 
illustrates only one of the possible functional relationships between PV and i that 
result from various collections of values for D, P, S, and p. In this section, we 
examine the “shape” of their impact more closely. 
There are three kinds of functional relationships that can emerge. To see this, take 
the derivative of the PV function, Eq. (5), with respect to i: 
(6) 
This derivative is clearly positive if P > D. If, however, D > P, then the derivative is 
positive for low values” of i and negative at high values of i; there is, therefore, a 
value of i which yields a maximum value of PV. This maximum ( PVma ) occurs at 
and is 
pv,,-(wv@+P) 
a+p * (8) 
‘The analysis, of course, still requires one traditional parameter: D, the current flow of real net 
benefits attributable to the development project. 
“That is, at values above but near p. 
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But this PVm” is positive only if 
Thus, three possible patterns of PV and i emerge, depending upon whether: 
These are shown in Fig. 3. Only curves of type (1) ever display a positive PV. 
Thus, for a development project to pass the PV test, it is necessary-but not 
sufficient, of course- that inequality (9) hold. 
The importance of D and P in inequality (9) is readily comprehended by common 
sense; the importance of S and p is not. But a few numerical examples are 
illuminating. In Fig. 4 are drawn the critical curves showing the parameter loci at 
which inequality (9) is just fulfilled, at values of the sum of (6 + p) equal to 0.01 
and 0.10. Even if (6 + p) is as low as 0.01, D must be more than 1.5 times P if a 
development project is to be able to pass the PY test at some i. If (S + p) is more 
like 0.10, even a quite small value of P is sufficient to insure that only for very large 
values of D will a project be able to pass the PV test at some i. 
In short, consideration of current preservation benefits (P) is important: these 
provide a sort of floor to the flow of development benefits (0) needed to justify a 
project. But current flows of preservation benefits are seldom (measurably) large. 
And it is here that the rate of growth of preservation benefits (p) and rate of decay 
of development benefits (6) may enter critically to defeat seemingly profitable 
development projects. Small values of the sum, (6 + p), can be influential and small 
changes can be significant.” 
“It should be noted that all of these results hold as long as 6 is less than p. It is not strictly necessary 
that development benefits decay. 
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III. NOW OR NEVER 
The very manner in which the PV test has been conceived in Sections I and II 
implies that the development project is a now-or-never decision. In each of Eqs. (l), 
(2), and (5), the PI/ of the development now (i.e., at t = 0) is computed, and the 
PV 3 0 test implicitly compares the development project now with the alternative of 
preservation forever. While we continue to assume, until Section VI, that the 
wilderness disruption is irreversible, we must now consider the possibility that the 
development project is postponable. It is pretty obvious that postponement of a 
project where benefits are decaying over time is unprofitable, but exploration of the 
possibility yields other insights. 
Consider the same development project discussed in the preceding two sections, 
except that it is to be implemented at time T (T > 0), with the preservation benefits 





O” pe-(i-PP dt, 
r=T 
D = -e -iT + i+6e -(i+a)f _ pe-(i--P)Tm 
i-p (10) 
It is possible to show that there are only two kinds of loci that this PV can follow 
over different values of T-those shown in Fig. 5. Take the derivative of Eq. (10) 
with respect to T: 
dPV - = ,-iT[ i - D~-“T + pepT]. 
dT (11) 
If this is positive at T = 0, it is clearly positive for all T > 0, and hence the PV 
approaches an asymptote of zero from below, as shown in part (1) of Fig. 5. On the 
other hand, if the derivative (11) is negative at T = 0, it must become positive at 
some positive value of T since its negative (middle) term is decaying more rapidly 
than its two positive terms as T increases. Since again the PV must approach zero 
from below in the limit as T approaches infinity, the locus must cross the T-axis at 
To, as pictured in part (2) of Fig. 5. 
The two loci displayed in Fig. 5 clearly show that development should be a 
now-or-never decision. In part (l), the PV is at its most negative if development were 
to occur now and the PV improves the longer it is postponed-although the decision 
should be to postpone forever. In part (2), the PV is at its most positive now and PV 
declines steadily until it becomes negative and stays negative-ideally, the decision 
is development now. All this is obvious. What is not so obvious is that, if PV is 
positive for development now, PV becomes negative for development at some (finite) 
future time (i.e., at time To in part (2) of Fig. 5. This latter fact has three interesting 
implications. 
One implication is that socially profitable wilderness development must be 
expedited, for every moment’s delay reduces the PV of its profitability.‘2 Indeed, if 
‘*That PV falls, as viewed from T = 0, at least until values of T > T,, is seen in part (2) of Fig. 5. It 
can also be shown that the PV at time T of development at time T falls as T increases. 




the development decision is procrastinated beyond T,, the project becomes harmful.r3 
A second implication is that, for obstinate preservationists, delay tactics are more 
than a graceless refusal to accept what is inevitable and socially profitable. If the 
development decision can be stalled, its apparent social profitability will decay. 
Indeed, a delay past T, will lead to a correct (at T,) decision that the development 
ought not be undertaken. These two implications together suggest one more reason 
why court battles between developers and preservationists are so intense. Not only 
are there differences in parameter estimates to be reconciled, but the date of the 
decision is critical even after agreement on parameter values is achieved. 
The third implication is more philosophical. We know that, if a development 
project is profitable now-in the sense that its PV at T = 0 is positive-it will 
sooner or later become unprofitable, i.e., after To. This means that, from the 
viewpoint of all generations of citizens to arrive after To, considered as a single 
group, the development is unprofitable. The decision to develop at T = 0 is therefore 
an affirmation that the interests of one group, namely, the citizenry during 0 < T < 
To, transcend the interests of the larger group of all future citizens. This result can be 
perceived mechanically as the inevitable result of the discounting process; and it is 
131f the size of the development project is a variable, it is relatively simple to extend this framework to 
show that the optimal size of a profitable development diminishes over time and ultimately become zero, 
if preservation benefits are growing relative to development benefits [ 181. 
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true that a sufficient lowering of the discount rate will always reverse the decision to 
develop.14 But there still nags the larger question: Can the opposing interests of this 
and future generations be so cavalierly reconciled as the adding up of “discounted” 
net benefits implies? The rationale of the dilatory tactic may well be that an 
irreversible development project ought not be undertaken if it is so patently not 
inter-generationally Pareto preferred-even though, in principle, the current genera- 
tion could bribe the future generation to accept the project.” We return to this 
problem in Section V. 
IV. ESTIMATION OF THE PARAMETERS 
Each of the three parameters introduced by the new approach--P, 6, and 
p-presents a far more difficult problem of estimation than does the traditional 
development project parameter, D. But for two of them at least, 6 and P, there are 
standard if not entirely satisfactory procedures of estimation. For 6, explicit extrapo- 
lation of the expected trends of development benefits and costs is needed. For P, 
estimation of the current consumer surplus of wilderness users, is conceptually 
straightforward, although it is made difficult in practice by the fact that wilderness is 
usually underpriced [29]. It is the final parameter, p, for which the new approach has 
also developed a new technique of estimation. 
The rate of expansion of the willingness to pay for wilderness activities in a 
particular area (p) is seen, in the new approach, as a function of the rates at which 
the vertical and the horizontal intercept of the demand curve for that area are 
shifting outward. Although the linkage to consumer behavior theory is not tight, it is 
not unreasonable to think that the high income elasticity of the demand for 
wilderness activities and the continued reduction in the supply of substitutable 
preserved wild spaces will indeed raise both intercepts. If the shift rate of the vertical 
intercept is o and of the horizontal intercept is h, and the demand curve is assumed 
to be linear, then the willingness to pay (equal, with the usual assumptions, to the 
area under the demand curve) grows at a rate of (v + h + vh), or, for small values 
of u and h, approximately (u + h). The estimate of p is then simply the sum of the 
estimates of u and h. 
There are, however, three problems. One, the estimation of u and h is not simple. 
One can extrapolate trends of visitor-days to estimate h fairly confidently enough, 
since the horizontal intercept is the observable component of the demand curve for 
an unpriced facility. l6 But an estimate of income elasticity is not adequate as an 
indication of u. With a higher income, a wilderness consumer would presumably visit 
more often as well as be willing to pay more per visit, and there is no simple way to 
find out how much of the income elasticity affects h rather than u. 
The second problem involves the carrying capacity of the wilderness area. If some 
of the demanders (at zero price) must be turned away, the rate of growth of the 
willingness to pay is no longer as high as (u + h). Under the new approach, it is 
usually then estimated to be declining steadily from (u + h) to just u.” This is 
141n terms of Fig. 3, a value of i below i, will render the development project unprofitable. 
“As it could as long as alternative investment projects yielding an internal rate of return of at least i 
are available. 
161n practice, travel costs must be reckoned with. 
“See, for example, [25, Appendix 6-A] or [24, Appendix B]. See the Appendix for proofs of the 
statements of this section. 
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correct provided that entry into the wilderness area is somehow restricted only to the 
highest willingness-to-pay users. l8 Inasmuch as price has rarely been used, indeed 
contemplated, as a rationing device for public wilderness recreation, it is difficult to 
see how such an allocation would be achieved. It seems more likely that entry would 
be rationed randomly or by queue, in which case the rate of growth of preservation 
benefits is less rapid. In fact, if queueing is adopted as the allocation device, the net 
willingness to pay (i.e., in excess of the time “paid” in the queue, which is a resource 
cost, not a transfer) may even decline over time. In sum, once capacity is reached, the 
traditional techniques of rationing wilderness access do not ensure a maximum 
growth of total willingness to pay, and the assumption that they do will mean an 
overstatement of the rate of growth of wilderness benefits. 
The final problem derives from the fact that the number of potential users of a 
particular wilderness area grows for two reasons, from a general growth in wilder- 
ness demand and from a shrinkage in the size, quality, and number of alternative 
wilderness areas. If the demand curve for total wilderness areas is shifting rightward 
(i.e., in its horizontal intercept) at rate h and the total capacity of wilderness is 
contracting at rate c, then the rightward demand shift for any particular wilderness 
area that remains preserved becomes (h + c) and the rate of growth of the total 
willingness-to-pay is (u + h + c). I9 This means that the estimate of p requires 
estimates not only of 2) and h but also of c, the rate at which comparable, 
substitutable wilderness areas are being destroyed. Estimates of p based only on 2) 
and h will be underestimates.” 
Discussion of estimation techniques indicates more clearly the ultimate basis of 
differences between beavers and druids. The “old” parameter, D, was at least one on 
which honest, reasonable, objective analysts should have been able to agree. Esti- 
mates of willingness to pay for unpriced activities (i.e., P) and of the rate of change 
in the future of the development benefits (i.e., S) are inherently more debatable. And 
the rate of growth over time of wilderness demand (i.e., p) is an estimate to which 
tremendous uncertainty must irremedially adhere. Indeed, inasmuch as p depends 
upon the rate at which the total wilderness capacity is contracting (i.e., c), its 
estimate, so critical to the new approach, is partly dependent upon the degree to 
which the new approach succeeds in defending wilderness from development. 
Despite these uncertainties and interrelationships, the claim of the new approach is 
that its use is preferable to the conceptually erroneous, if more easily estimated, 
“old” approach. 
V. DISCOUNTING 
Preservationists have always felt ambivalent about the discount rate appropriate 
for benefit-cost analyses involving wilderness. On the one hand, their concern for the 
future suggested that a very low rate of discount should be attached to future benefit 
streams. On the other hand, the traditional development criterion-as shown in Fig. 
‘sProvided also that the total capacity of this and other similar (i.e., substitutable) wilderness areas is 
not contracting. This problem is discussed in the next paragraph. 
“Declining to o as time passes. 
“Unless h is carefully defined to be the rate of shift of demand for the particular wilderness area; 
then, it should be noticed, there is again an implicit general-equilibrium model lurking ,behind the 
estimate. 
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1 and Eq. (1)-required only that D be greater than i, and hence made more likely a 
decision for development the lower the discount rate used.*’ 
This ambivalence is much mitigated under the new approach since projected 
development of wilderness areas will now fail the benefit-cost test if either a low 
enough or a high enough interest rate is applied-as shown in Fig. 2 and Eq. (5). 
Nevertheless, the controversy persists because a range of interest rates is actually 
observed in capital markets, because there is no consensus as to which most nearly 
reflects whatever it is the discount rate in benefit-cost analysis is supposed to reflect, 
and because the wilderness development or preservation decision so often turns 
critically on which discount rate is selected. 
From the spectrum of observed market interest rates, economic theory focuses on 
two concepts: the social rate of discount (or time preference), which we hereafter 
refer to as i; and the social rate of return on investment (or opportunity cost of 
capital), which we hereafter refer to as r. It is generally agreed that the latter, r, 
exceeds the former, i, owing to taxation [20], the public-good attribute of saving [26], 
and/or the excess of private over socially optimal risk aversion [ 11. 
One can make a case, with the stereotypical project being considered here, for 
using either the social time preference rate (i) or the rate of return on investment 
(r). It depends whether the resource flows (positive and negative) generated by the 
project represent changes in consumption or investment. The basic Eq. (5) is derived 
on the assumption that all the resource flows represent changes in consumption at 
the moment they occur. Thus, the initial investment of $1 means a reduction in 
consumption of $1 at t = 0 and hence has a present value of - $1. The development 
benefits (De-“‘) and the foregone preservation benefits (Pep’) represent changes in 
consumption in year t, and hence their present value requires multiplication by e-“, 
i being the social rate of time preference (between consumption now and consump- 
tion later). 
But one might just as well argue that all the resource flows represent changes in 
investment, only becoming a change in consumption at some very distant time, T.’ 
The present value of such a consumption stream is 
= e(r-i)T 
I 
- 1 + D P --- 
r+6 I r-p * 
(12) 
This present value is positive or negative according as the quantity within the 
brackets is positive or negative; but this is nothing else but the basic benefit-cost 
equation (5) with r substituted for i throughout. 
While a case can be made for using either i or r in the benefit-cost analysis, only 
one of the cases can be empirically correct. A resource flow in fact changes either 
consumption or investment (or some combination of them). Unfortunately, it is not 
easy to know which. ** But the choice may be critical. Suppose, for example, for our 
*‘See, for examples, [25, p, 8911.; 10, pp. 268-270; 8, pp. 159-1611. For a good summary of the more 
profound economic-philosophical problems with discounting where inter-generational decisions are being 
made, see [14, Chap. 10; 331. 
**See, for fuller discussion of this choice, [ 17, 71. 
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stereotypical project, that we know (somehow) the initial $1 investment means 
foregone investment elsewhere and all the resulting new development and lost 
preservation flows mean equivalent changes in consumption. The present value of 
this project is 




P = -;+A-- 
i-p’ (13) 
The conceptual difference between Eq. (13) and the basic equation (5) is that r is no 
longer treated as identical to i. And the practical difference is that, since r > i, the 
PV of the project is reduced. Recognition that the initial investment component of a 
project is more likely than the project’s other flows to mean foregone investment 
elsewhere makes more stringent the test which must be passed by any investment 
project, including projects which would develop wild areas. 
It should also be noted that this explicit introduction of r > i may fundamentally 
alter the shape of the relationship between PV and i. From the basic equation (5), 
three different shapes were possible according to the relative values of the parame- 
ters, D, P, S and p (as shown in Fig. 3). There, the PV changed sign (as i increased 
from p) either twice or not at all. With the introduction of r, under the assumptions 
that lead to Eq. (13), the PV changes sign at most once.23 To the extent that the 
present assumptions are more typical of wilderness development projects, the last 
vestige of ambivalence about interest rates on the part of preservationists (mentioned 
at the start of this section) is removed. For sufficiently high values of i, a 
development project will be profitable provided only that its initial benefits (D) 
exceed the initial foregone preservation benefits (P) plus the opportunity cost of the 
initial capital required (r). But at sufficiently low values of i, that same project will 
fail the benefit-cost test. The introduction of r also increases the critical value of i 
below which the development project fails. The quantitative magnitude of the 
changes is not small, either, as numerical examples quickly show. For example, if 
D = 0.25,P = 0.05,6 = 0.01, p = 0.03, and r = 0.15, the internal rate of return (i.e. 
the value of i at which PV = 0) is roughly 4% if one ignores r (i.e., uses Eq. (5), 
where r = i)24 and roughly 9% if one takes the r into consideration (i.e., uses Eq. 
(13). 
Noting that the introduction of different values for r and i may critically affect 
wilderness decisions is one thing. One has still to decide which resource flows 
ultimately alter consumption and which investment, no easy task. But the most 
difficult job of all is to locate the correct values of these discount rates. Theory is of 
little use, partly because it is based on such idealized assumptions as perfect 
foresight and complete futures markets, and partly because it assumes that capital 
markets clear at a single interest rate, so that r = i. For what little it is worth, 
however, the counsel of economic theory is that optimal saving and investment paths 
23Set the PV equation (13) equal to zero, multiply through by i(i + 6)(i - p), and transform the 
variable to (i - p). getting (i - P)~( D - r-P)+(i-p)(...)--(6+p)P=O.ProvidedthatD> 
r + P, this quadratic in (i - p) has one positive real root regardless of the sign of the middle term 
(abbreviated to three dots above). 
244% is the lower internal rate of return (i.e., i, of curve (I) of Fig. 3). 
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probably imply low rates of interest, equal to such things as (1) the natural rate of 
growth (of “effective” labor) of the economy, (2) this growth rate times the (absolute 
value of the) elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption with respect to 
consumption, or (3) this product of growth rate and elasticity plus a “utility discount 
factor.“25 Such mean clues are further depreciated by difficulty of quantification, 
even intuitively, of the concepts, elasticity of marginal utility and the utility discount 
factor.26 
But information about some hypothetical or efficient market-clearing interest rate 
is, in any case, of little use to the quester “in the dark jungles of the second best” [5, 
p. 7891. Where different interest rates are relevant, they must be recognized and 
estimated. Wilderness benefit-cost analysis cannot consider less than two interest 
rate concepts. One, the opportunity cost of capital (r), is eminently estimable, in 
principle and in fact. It is simply the (pre-tax) value of the productivity of the 
relevant marginal investments of the economy. *’ The difficult estimate, in principle 
and in fact, is of the social rate of time preference (i). It must be used whenever 
society contemplates altering consumption, as opposed to investment, across time. 
But the greater ease of conceptualization and estimation of r, relative to i, has led 
some economists to recommend the rejection of i as a relevant ingredient in 
benefit-cost analysis.28 
Others offer a more sophisticated rationale for concentrating on the opportunity 
cost of capital (r) as the discount factor throughout a benefit-cost analysis. If 
opportunities exist for investment at rate r, then future generations ccln a/ways be 
made better off if development projects are pursued that pass the benefit-cost test 
when discounted at rate r. Reference to Eq. (12) makes this clear. Insistence by the 
preservationist on the continued inclusion in the analysis of some rate i, below r, 
rests on one (or both) of two beliefs. One, the bribe necessary to induce “the future” 
to accept a development project may require that “the present” save and invest a 
large portion not only of the returns to the wilderness development project but also 
of the returns to the previously invested retums.29 The use of a low value of i in 
place of r may simply reflect a lack of trust, on the part of the preservation&, that 
this great debt to the future will be honored through sufficiently high saving rates, 
especially as the net benefits received from the development project dwindle ex- 
ponentially. There may be, in short, a conflict between what is potentially Pareto 
25For a brief tour through the theory, see [30, 1, 321. The received theory also shows that the 
competitive market solution, despite the absence of all the usual sources of inefficiency, may be 
inefficient; see, for example, [ 151. 
26Nor is the empirical evidence about time preference sufficiently focused to be of much help. Some 
people lend their wealth at near-zero real rates of interest, while others borrow-even in advanced 
countries with supposedly developed capital markets-at rates of 20%50% Micro studies have estimated 
private time preference at rates as high as 33% [ 1, p. IS]; and macro studies have estimated social time 
preference at rates as low as 1% [27]. 
“Relevant in the opportunity-cost sense of the investments that will actually be foregone if the 
wilderness development project is embarked upon. 
2*For example, [28]: “Since the collective private rate of time preference does not provide a basis for 
determining a social rate of discount, the only observed rates available for use as a guide for the 
evaluation of public projects is [sic] the rate of return on private capital or the opportunity cost of private 
capital.” (p. 38) 
291n the stereotypical project, the development project can increase consumption at all t only if, in 
addition to passing the test of Eq. (12), at least a fraction, p/r, of all returns (0,) are invested (and 
reinvested) at rate r. 
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preferred and what will probably eventuate, and the low i is a means of giving 
weight to this probability.30 The second belief, on which the insistence on the use of 
a low i may rest, is that with each wilderness development, the options of future 
generations are being irreversibly reduced. Our uncertainty about the rate of growth 
of the costs of these lost options makes our current estimate, p, a highly inadequate 
parameter for a benefit-cost analysis which ignores uncertainty. One long-honored, 
if much debated, way out of this uncertainty dilemma is the use of a risk-premium in 
the discount factor itself.3’ The gap between r and i may reflect the preservationist’s 
feeling of uncertainty about the evaluation of wilderness by future generations. 
Whichever the rationale, the wilderness preservationist should urge that two 
different discount rates (r and i) be used in assessing a potential development 
project, depending upon whether investment or consumption flows are affected. This 
dichotomization of the discount factor can make a critical difference in the evalua- 
tion of wilderness development projects. To see this, consider our stereotypical 
wilderness destruction-cum-development project along side of a stereotypical “in- 
dustrial” project-a project without environmental implications that promises a 
perpetual flow of net benefits at a rate of $x at an investment cost today of $1. The 
present value of the industrial project, assuming the initial $1 to be diverted from 
investible funds elsewhere and the $x flow to go entirely to consumption, is simply 
py= 2+x 
i i’ (14) 
This industrial project should be undertaken if x > r. Note that the value of i is 
irrelevant to the decision.32 
While the value of i makes no difference to the evaluation of the “industrial” 
project, it dues make a difference to the evaluation of the wilderness project-as 
inspection of Eq. (13) makes clear. Indeed, there is a locus of values of r and i which 
makes the PV of the wilderness project exactly zero, PY being positive on one side 
and negative on the other side of that locus. This locus may be found by setting the 
PV of Eq. (13) equal to zero and solving for r in terms of (the various other 
parameters and) i: 
,=&D-&P. (19 
The break-even locus of the wilderness project (i.e., Eq. (15)) and the break-even 
locus of the industrial project (i.e., x = r from Eq. (14)) are both plotted in Fig. 6. 
Four regions are thereby demarcated, and the effective roles of each of the 
parameters, r and i, can be seen. Higher values of r make fewer projects profitable-a 
reasonable result since higher values of r mean that high-productivity alternative 
investments are available. But higher values of i make only the wilderness develop- 
ment projects more profitable. Again, a reasonable result, since higher values of i 
mean that society values near-future consumption (0,) more than distant-future 
301t is, of course, not the only way. Baumol[5] has suggested that “a set of selective subsidies” (p. 801) 
is preferable. The advantage of a low i is that it does not need to be haggled, ad hoc, for each project. 
“See, for example, [16, pp. 86fQ. 
‘*One could just as well ignore i in this PV equation, using r throughout as the discount factor. Then, 
PV= -I +x/r,whichalsoyieldsPV>Oifx>r. 
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FIGURE 6 
consumption (P,). Those who would protect wilderness through benefit-cost analyses 
want both realistic values of r and low values of i. 
Before leaving Fig. 6, we should notice that the use of a low value of i is not “a 
Robin Hood activity stood on its head” [5, p. 800]. It is low values of r that lead to 
more investment projects being accepted and hence a redistribution from (current) 
poor to (future) rich generations. A lower value of i, ceteris paribus, can only reduce 
the total number of projects accepted by reducing the number of wilderness 
development projects undertaken. 
How low should i be? We return to the basic problem. Neither theory nor 
evidence provides much insight. One can use introspection. Consider a willingness- 
to-pay a century from now of $1 (in today’s prices) to see the Grand Canyon; how 
much is that worth today? At an i as high as 58, it is $0.0067, less than one penny. 
Even at an i of 3W, it is only $0.0498, less than a nickel. It is unfortunate that 
wilderness preservation must turn on so personal and debatable a parameter, but 
there may be no escape. 
VI. REVERSIBILITY 
So far we have been assuming, as does most of the preservationist literature, that 
any wilderness development project is forever irreversible. In many cases this is quite 
reasonable, unless one takes a geologist’s view of time. For example, flooding the 
Grand Canyon, damming Hetch Hetchy, or logging the redwoods are for all 
practical purposes irreversible acts. For other wilderness areas and for other devel- 
opment activities, the process is reversible in the simple. sense that reasonable 
amounts of time and resources are sufficient to restore wilderness values. 
The fact that the development benefits (De-*‘) are high for the near future and 
that the wilderness benefits (Pep’) become high later on suggests that, if reversibility 
is possible, a sequence of development followed by wilderness restoration should be 
considered. This change in tactic means that the entire task of the wilderness 
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advocate changes. It is necessary to determine two things: (1) whether the develop- 
ment project should be undertaken, and (2) whether (and when) the area should be 
reconverted to wilderness. Mathematically, the PV formula becomes somewhat more 
complex. The development benefits are earned and the wilderness benefits foregone 
only until time T, when reconversion occurs; and the net cost of reconversion (R) 
must be introduced: 33 
PV= -1+ J rraDe- 
(i+&)t& _ 1’ Pe-(i-p)tdl _ Re-iT, 
t=O 
= _ 1 + f$ [ 1 - e-(i+W] - &[ 1 - e-(i+p)T] - Re-iT. (16) 
Analysis of this PV must occur in two stages. First, the optimal reconversion date, T, 
must be calculated (i.e., where dPV/dT = 0; note that d2PV/dT2 < 0 there). Then, 
for the optimal value of T, the PV of the entire project must be evaluated. The new 
term of Eq. (16), the one that involves R, plays a role in both these evaluations. 
Higher (net) restoration costs push further into the future the time at which the 
restoration of the wilderness should occur, but they also make it less likely that 
development should occur at all. Explicit consideration of the possibility of reversi- 
bility means that the choice is no longer between T = 0 and T = co. The problem of 
now or never, discussed in Section III, need not arise. Indeed, a solution that is more 
nearly Pareto optimal between generations may present itself. The current genera- 
tion may reap the benefits of development of the area, and later generations 
nevertheless enjoy the restored wilderness. 
Several practical problems arise for the wilderness preservation&, or rather in this 
case the wilderness reservation&. At the time of the development (i.e., at t = 0), it is 
essential that there be formal commitment that the area is reserved for ultimate 
status as wilderness. In principle, this presents no problem provided we have been 
correct in our assessment that the development benefits are decaying, but there is 
always the danger that the first development will be quietly succeeded by a second, 
different project without a new social benefit-cost test. It is at once too much and 
not enough that the date of restoration (T) be fixed definitely. Circumstances, 
uncertain now, may arise that require the date of restoration to be postponed; in 
other circumstances, the development project may exhaust itself unexpectedly early 
and the quiet successor must be alertly avoided. The final problem concerns the 
liability for reconversion costs. For social efficiency, it is irrelevant as long as the 
development decision and the reversion date are correctly decided. But in practice, 
this may be the most difficult issue. 
VII. POSTPONABILITY 
So far we have been assuming that the development project under consideration is 
inexhaustible-in the sense that its net benefits go on forever, albeit at a declining 
rate over time.34 Under such a circumstance, the question of postponement is 
33By net cost is meant the restoration costs minus the salvage value of the installed development capital 
at time T; this net cost is generally much larger than mere “interment” costs [23, p. 3791. I assume, for 
simplicity, that restoration occurs instantaneously at T, and I ignore any difference between r and i. 
341f the cause of the declining rate of net benefit flow is rising real extraction costs, one might call this 
a situation of asymptotic exhaustibility. 
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irrelevant; as was shown in Section III, an irreversible, inexhaustible development 
project should be undertaken now or never. We now consider an irreversible but 
exhaustible development project, i.e., one in which the net benefit flow ceases within 
a finite period, but the preservation benefits are nevertheless lost forever.35 Examples 
of such projects are not rare: petroleum extraction that leads to the extinction of 
species or strip mining that scars a wilderness almost irreversibly from the view of 
reconversion cost and time. For such exhaustible development projects, it can be 
shown that postponement may be a socially profitable decision.36 
Consider, for simplicity, not the development project we have been considering- 
that lasts forever-but rather a development project of the extreme opposite 
character-that yields all its costs and benefits at a single moment of time (T). 
Thus, at time T, the development project would cost $1 in initial investment and 
yield DeuT in net benefit, where D is the net benefit the project would offer if it were 
undertaken now (i.e., at T = 0), and (Y is the rate of appreciation of the value of the 
project’s output. The rate of appreciation might be negative (as earlier for 6), but it 
is obvious that the project then is a now-or-never decision since its (momentary) 
benefits decline as time passes while its investment cost and preservation opportun- 
ity cost do not. But there are many extracted resources whose prices are expected to 
rise over time. The PV of development at time T is37 
py = -e--iT + De-(i-4T - 
/ r=T 
=e _ 1 + D~~T - - (17) 
where the final term reflects the benefits of the continued wilderness use until 
time T. 
There is no current controversy about postponement unless the development 
project passes its PV test now; whenever it does, it means that the PV at T = 0 in 
Eq. (17) is positive, i.e., 
-l+D- 
P 
- > 0. 
i-p 
This project, although profitable now, should be postponed if its PV rises over time. 
Take the derivative of Eq. (17) with respect to T and evaluate it at T = 0: 
dPV 
dT T=,, 
= i - (i - a)D + P. 
This must be negative or the project will become more valuable (in a PV sense) in 
the future than it is now. And in this latter case, it should be postponed despite its 
current profitability. Inspection of (18) and (19) indicates that the lower the value of 
i or the higher the value of a, the more likely it is that the project will fail at least one 
of these tests. 
35Reversible, exhaustible development projects provide similar problems of analysis and are not 
examined here. 
36See, for an example of such a project, 161. 
371gnoring any difference between r and i throughout. 
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The new approach to wilderness preservation must examine exhaustible develop- 
ment projects from two viewpoints. Such projects, if they are to be sensibly 
undertaken now, must prove to be (1) socially profitable now and (2) not even more 
profitable later. If either test is failed, the wilderness should be preserved, at least for 
the time being. 
VIII. SUMMARY 
The intent of this paper has been to provide an exposition of the kinds of changes 
of benefit-cost technique the new approach demands and of the kinds of changes in 
results that may ensue. It should be noted once more that the reliance throughout, 
for simplicity, on a “stereotypical project” of wilderness development means that 
many of the results are not necessarily generalizable and are certainly not quantita- 
tively meaningful.38 Qualitative changes in wilderness benefit-cost techniques and 
results, brought on through the new approach, are many and dramatic. The principal 
changes (numbered by the section of the paper in which they are derived): 
1. Explicit introduction of a measure of the wilderness values foregone through 
development means that the shape of the decision process is dramatically altered. 
Development projects may fail their benefit-cost tests not only because the discount 
rate is too high but also because it is too low. 
2. Not only are both the current flows of net benefits from wilderness develop- 
ment and preservation (i.e., D and P) critical to the benefit-cost analysis, but also 
the rates of change over time of these benefits (i.e., S and p) are important. 
3. Wilderness development projects, if they are socially profitable at all, are 
probably most profitable now. Delay generally reduces their profitability, which fact 
raises tough questions of inter-generational equity. 
4. Measuring the time-flow of benefits of preserved wilderness, as the new 
approach requires, is no easy task-especially difficult is the rate of growth in the 
future of people’s willingness to pay for wilderness activities. The new approach has 
sharpened the conceptual basis of these estimates. 
5. In a world where multiple interest rates are observed, the necessarily second-best 
analysis of wilderness development projects must utilize at least two discounting 
concepts. The rate of return to investment (r) may be sufficient for assessing 
“industrial” projects, but the rate of social time preference (i) is also needed for 
assessing wilderness projects. 
6. Where the development project is reversible-i.e., the wilderness restorable- 
the benefit-cost test must also determine the date at which (and if) reversion to 
wilderness should occur. 
7. Where an exhaustible development project is being considered, the benefit-cost 
test must also determine the date at which the exploitation should begin-even if 
socially profitable now, the development project may nevertheless be profitably 
postponed. 
APPENDIX 
The rate at which the total willingness to pay (TWP) for wilderness activity grows 
depends upon the means by which it is rationed. In this appendix the formulas are 
“In practice, for example, neither 0, nor P, are likely to involve smooth exponential trends. 
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derived for TWP and its growth rate under three different rationing systems: (i) the 
highest willingness-to-pay demanders gain entry; (ii) entry is permitted at random 
among all positive willingness-to-pay demanders; and (iii) entry is restricted by 
queue. The principal results are that (i) the first of these three rationing systems 
displays the highest level and growth rate of TWP; (ii) the third of the three 
rationing systems displays the lowest level and growth rate of TWP; and (iii) in no 
case is the growth rate of TWP closely approximated by the simple sum of the rates 
of shift of the vertical and horizontal intercepts of the demand curve. 
Consider a system of wilderness areas the demand curve for which is shifting 
upward and outward over time and the supply of which is contracting over time. 
Assume for simplicity that the demand curve is linear; by suitable choice of units, let 
1 be both the maximum willingness-to-pay (w) of any user at time zero (t = 0) and 
the maximum flow of users (q) that would enter at zero price at time zero (see Fig. 
A-l). We start the analysis at the moment when the carrying capacity of the 
wilderness system is just adequate to permit entry to all demanders who display a 
positive value of w. As time passes, the vertical intercept of the willingness-to-pay 
curve shifts up at rate u; the horizontal intercept shifts out at rate h; and the 
capacity of the wilderness shrinks at rate c. Figure A-l shows the demand and 
supply (capacity) curves at time 0 and t. 
If a competitive market were to allocate wilderness access, a price would appear at 
time zero and would rise over time (to e”r[l - e-(h+c)t] at time t, as shown in Fig. 
A-l). Such a price would effectively restrict the use of the wilderness capacity (eve’) 
to only the highest willingness-to-pay demanders out of the total potential demand 
(e”‘). Markets are, however, not currently used to allocate wilderness use among 
competing applicants. We consider three rationing systems. 
1. The highest willingness-to-pay demanders gain entry. At time t, entry is somehow 
apportioned just as a market would, so that all actual users are willing to pay 
between (e”‘) and e”‘[l - e -(h+c)‘]. Because the demand curve is assumed linear, 
WILtlNGNESS 
TO PAY ,w, 
I CAPACITY AT TlflE t 
,OEtlANO AT TIME o 
OEMAND AT TIME t 
1 e ht 
FLOW OF USERS (ql 
FIGURE Al 
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the average TWP per unit of wilderness is half-way between the high and low values: 
TWP = e”‘[ 1 _ +e-(h+C)t]. (A-1) 
And the rate of growth is 
dTWP/dt= 
v - f(v - h - C)e-(h+c)t 
TWP 1 - ;e-vt+c)’ . (A-2) 
It should be noted that this growth rate, the equivalent of the p of the text, is not a 
constant over time. It is (U + h + c) at time zero and declines to (0) as time goes to 
infinity. Thus, ultimately only the vertical-intercept shift matters for p, but in the 
near future, p is the sum of all three rates- i.e., the rate of vertical shift of the 
demand curve, the rate of horizontal shift of the demand curve, and the (absolute 
value of the) rate of contraction of total wilderness capacity. 
2. Entry is permitted at random among all positive willingness-to-pay demanders. At 
time t, entry is permitted for a random collection of users whose willingness-to-pay 
ranges from zero to (e”‘). With a linear demand curve, this means that the average 
TWP per unit of wilderness left is exactly half-way between these values: 
TWP = leVt 
2 . (A-3) 
And the rate of growth is 
(A-4) 
Both the level (at any time t) and the growth rate of the TWP are lower than under 
the previous system, whereby only the highest valued willingness-to-pay demanders 
gained access. It should be noted that, under random entry, neither the rate of 
horizontal shift of the demand curve (h) nor the rate of shrinkage of the total 
wilderness area (c) affects the rate of growth of TWP (i.e., of the p used in the text). 
3. Entry is restricted by queue. Assuming for simplicity that the queue is literally a 
line of potential wilderness users at the ranger station, we would find that line 
lengthening until the prospect of lost time was just sufficient to discourage a 
fraction, (1 - edch+‘jt ), of the potential demanders from seeking admission. The 
TWP of the actual wilderness depends on the length of the queue, who is admitted, 
and the value of their time. Consider the simple case where the value of time is the 
same for all potential demanders. Then the queue will lengthen until the time wasted 
is exactly equal (in value) to (e”‘[l - e--(h+c)r I), and the willingness to pay of the 
actual users will be the excess of their willingness to pay (w) above this value of 
wasted time. This will range smoothly from zero to e(v-h-c)r, and hence the average 
TWP per unit of wilderness left will be 
TWP = $eW--c)t. (A-5) 
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Both the level and the growth rate of this TWP are the lowest of the three rationing 
systems. Indeed, the growth rate in (A-6) may even be negutiue. For a variety of 
plausible growth rates (i.e., of u, h, and c) of demand and supply, the lengthening of 
the queue may erode all or more than all of the potential gains in TWP. 
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